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Section l.June 1968 P.750. 
l~ A truck ow1ed a~d operated by Wi~liam Hill was involved i~ a collision in the 
C1ty of Richmond w1th a car owned and operated by Thomas Rav1ne. Ravine called upon 
Hill to pay him ~plO,OOO damages for personal injuries and for damage to his auto-
mobile. Hill and Ravine eonferred at 2 P.M. on May 15, 1968, for the purpose of 
comprising Ravine's claim and effecting a settlement. During their discussion Hill 
said to Ravine: 11 I recognize that t~e collision was my fault because I ran through 
a red light at the intersection wher,e the collision occurred." Although the parties 
conferred for over an hour in an effort to effect a compromise and settlement they 
could not agree. Thereupon Ravine sued Hill in the Circuit Court of the City of 
Richmond to recover damages for his 'injuries and for damage to his automobile. 
During the trial of the action Ravine, who was the first witness to take the stand 
offered to testify that between the hours of 2p.m. and 3 p.m. on May 15, 1968, ' 
Hill stated: "I recognize that the collision was my fault because I ran through a 
red light at the intersection where the collision occurred." Counsel for Hill ob-
jected to Ravine testifying that Hill made the statement on the ground that the 
statement was made during negotiations for compromise and settlement, and that the 
evidence was therefore not ad.miss!1:le. How should the Court rule on the objection? 
The objection should be overruled. The mere offer to make a settlement would not 
be received as an admission of the party making the offer. However,an express 
admission of liability made by one of the parties during negotiations for a com-
promise is an independent fact pertinent to the issue in question and is, there-
fore, admissible. Brickell v. Shawn, 175 Va.323; City of Richmond v. A.H.Ewings 
Sons,Inc., 201 Va.862; Hendrickson v. Meredith, 16I'Va:I93. (EVIDENCE) 
2. Hannibal Richman entered into a written contract at 3 p.m. on March 20,1968, 
with Gilder Lily by the terms of which Richman agreed to purchase from Lily all of 
the materials to be used in constructing a swimming pool and bathhouse on Richman's 
estate known as "Sunset Hill". In addition to providing for the date of delivery, 
the purchase price to be paid and the quantity and quality of the materials to be 
furnished, the written contract contained the followimg provision: 
"This contract constitutes the entire agreement between the parties 
hereto, it being expressly understood that there are no representa-
tions, commitments or statements by the parties except as provided 
herein. 11 
'All of the materials, meeting the specifications required by the contract, weee 
delivered by Lily to nsunset Hill11 by the date specified in the contract, and 
fi~:·e days after delivery Lily presented Richman with a bill and demanded payment. 
R~.c:hman refused payment, claiming that he would pay the bill _only after Lily had 
c >nstructed the pool and the bathhouse as he agreed to do on the morning of March 
20., whereupon Lily sued Richman to recover the value of the materials delivered. 
In his grounds of defense Richman stated that he did not owe for the materials 
furnished, as Lily had not constructed the pool and bathhouse as he had orally 
contra.cted to do on the morning of March 20,_ 1968. During the trial of the action 
Richman offered to prove that he entered into an oral contract with Lily the morn-
ing of March ao, 1968, by the terms of which Lily agreed to construct the pool and 
bathhouse at "Sunset HilH~, Lily agreed to complete the construction by May 2:.5, 
1968,and Richman agreed to pay for all materials furnished for the construction of 
the pool and bathhouse ten days after completion of construction. Richman also 
offered to prove that Lily had not commenced construction nor had he made any 
attempt to complete the construction by the date agreed upon. Counsel for Lily 
objected to this evi dence on the ground that this evidence would violate the parol 
eYidence rule. How should the Court rule on the objection? 
(CONTRACTS) The objection should be overruled. Where it is apparent the 
written contract is not a complete integration of a ll prior and contemporaneous 
negotiations, parol evidence is admissible to supply those things omitted if the 
part omitted is not inconsistent with or contrary to the written contract. The 
term to be proved by parol evidence must be independent of and in addition to the 
written terms so that no merger has taken place. In this case, there was no t erm 
in the contract pertaining to the construction of the pool or the time of payment. 
751. 
The terms to be proven by parol evidence are, therefore, independent of and in 
addition to the written terms. The parol evidence is admissible to prove these 
terms. Durham v. Pool Equipment ££• '205 Va.441. 
4lt 3o Sally Wheel commenced an action ~n the Circuit Court of Campbell County, Vao, 
against Joe Motorist to recover damages for personal injuries growing out of an 
automobile collision. Motorist filed :grounds of defense denying the averments of 
negligence contained in the motion for judgment and he a1s o filed a plea of con-
tributory negligence in which he set out the particulars thereof, but the plea 
contained no request, · for a reply thereto. Sally Wheel filed no written response 
to the plea of contributory negligencea Thirty days after the plea was filed, 
Motorist filed a written motion for s~ary judgment. How should the Court rule 
• 
on the motion? · 
(CIVI~ PROCEDURE) The motion should bel denied. As Motorist's plea did not contain 
express words requesting a reply, no ~ritten response was necessary. The allegations 
in the plea are to be taken as denied or avoided. Rule 3:11, Rules of Supreme 
Court £f. Appeals 9.!_ Virginia, - -
4o Moonlight Construction Co.Inc. commenced an action at law in the Circuit Court 
of Roanoke County, Va., against Thomas Ashton to recover damages for breach of a 
written contract. During the pendency of the action and before trial, Thomas Ashton 
died; and his son, Jerry Ashton$ was appointed and qualified as administrator of 
his estate. Plaintiff, fearing that the action will abate because of the death of 
the defendant, consults its attorney and inquires whether the action may be 
prosecuted to a conclusion or whether a new action must be commenced. 
What should plaintiff's attorney advise, and what action should be taken by 
plaintiff's attorney? 
(CIVIL PROCEDURE) The attorney should advise the plaintiff to prosecute the action 
to conclusion, substitutiong Jerry Ashton as the successor in interest to Thomas 
Ashton. The attorney should make a motion to the court to substitute Jerry Ashton 
as the successor in interest to Thomas. If Jerry does not consent to the motion; 
the attorney should then file his motion 1~th the clerk's office and the procedure 
would then proceed so if the motion were an original motion for judgment againsf 
the auccessor. Rule 3:17, ~£!Supreme Court of Appeals£! Virginiao 
5. In an action tried in the Circuit Court of Orange County, Va., defendant moved 
to strike plaintiff's evidence at the conclusion thereof, assigning grounds there-
fc;!', which motion the court overruled and the defendant's exception was noted. 
T~.0reupon defendant proceeded to introduce evidence in his own behalf, and at the 
conclusion thereof defendant against moved to strike plaintiff's evidence, assigning 
the same grounds therefor. The latter motion was overruled and the defendant's ex-
ception was noted. The jury hearing the case reported to the court that it could 
not agree upon a verdict. Whereupon the jury was discharged. Promptly after dis-
charge of the jury, the defendant again moved the court to strike the plaintiff's 
evidence, and enterjudgment for defendant, assigning the same grounds he had 
assigned in support of the two previous motions. 
May the Court entertain the motion to strike after the jury has been discharged7 
(CIVIL PROCEDUHE)The court may entertain the motion to strike the evidence after 
the discharge of the jury. "If the court overrules a moti on to strike the evidence 
and there is a hung jury, the moving party may renew the motioh immediately after 
the discharge of the jury, and, if the court is of opinion that it erred in denying 
the motion, it may enter judgment in favor of the moving party." Rule 1:11, Rules 
of Supreme Court of Appeal$ of Virginia. 
- -- -
6o White Trucking Lines, Inc., commenced an action in the U.S.District Court for the 
Western District of Virginia against Red Streak Trucking Lines, Inc., for the 
purpose of setting aside a contract between the parties upon the ground of fraud. 
The complaint filed by plaintiff did not contain an averment of the acts of fraud 
alleged to have been practiced by defendant but merely charged that: 11 The contract 
was entered into by plaintiff as a result of fraud practiced by defendant.n The 
• 
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d~fendant desired to challenge the sufficiency of the complaint. 
(a) How may he do this, and(b)How shbuld the Court rule on the challenge? 
(FEDERAL PROCEDURE) (a) The defendant can challenge the sufficiency of the complaint 
by a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint fails to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. Rule 12(b),Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(b) The court should grant the defendant's motion. 11 Inall avements of fraud or 
mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake should be stated with 
particularity". Rule 9(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
----
7. During the trial of a criminal prosecution in the Circuit Court of Roanoke 
County, Va., the Commonwealth offered evidence to prove the commission of the 
offense but did not offer evidence to prove that the offense had been committed in 
Roanoke County. After the attorney for the Commonwealth had rested his case, the 
accused moved the Court to strike the evidence of the Commonwealth on the ground 
that the evidence was insufficient to identify the accused as the party who committ-
ed the offense. The motion was overruled and the exception of the accused was noted. 
The accused offered no. evidence in his own behalf. A verdict of guilty was returned 
by the jury. The accused thereupon moved to set aside the verdict on the ground 
that the Commonwealth failed to prove that the offense had been committed in 
Roanoke County. How should the Court rule on the motion? 
(CRIMINAL PROCEDURE) The motion should be denied. Questions of venue must be raised 
in the trial court and before verdict in cases tried by a jury and before judgment 
in cases tried by the court sitting without a jury. Rule 1:8, Rules of Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia. ---
- - - -"""""---
8. Alfred Thomas, who resided in the City of Richmond, was the owner of a tract of 
land in Alleghany County, Va., where he spent each spring vacation. When he went to 
Allaghany County in Ma~ of 1968, he found that his neighbor, Paul Word, had been 
continually walking across the tract in order to catch a passenger bus on u.s. 
Route 60 which daily took him to Covington where he was employed. Thomas told Word 
that he must stop walking across the tract, but Word r eplied that he would not do 
so, and would continue his customary route as long as he retained his job in 
Covington. Thomas, through you as his attorney, thereupon filed against Word in the 
Circuit Court of Alleghany County a sworn bill of complaint alleging the foregoing 
£acts and praying that the court enjoin Word from further trespassing across the 
property of Thomas. Word has filed an answer to the bill in which he admits its 
alJ.egat ions, but further recites in his answer that he is partially crippled by 
art.hritis, that his customary route across the property of Thomas is shorter than 
walking over his own l and to reach the highway to catch the passenger bus, and that 
he has followed the route over Thomas' land on the advice of his doctor. His answer 
then prays that the bill of Thomas be dismissed. You properly advise Thomas that 
you believe the defense asserted by Word is not good. Thomas then asks you by what 
procedural methods, if any, he might obtain the injunction against Word without 
being required to incur the expense and delay resulting from extended litigation. 
What should your answer be? 
(CIVIL PHOCEDURE,EQUITY) The proper procedural method by which the sufficiency of a 
defensive pleading may be challenged is by a motion to strike out the pleading. If 
the motion is gr~nted, the court may allow the defendant to amend his pleading. If 
the amended pleading is also found to be insufficient, the defendant may be examined 
upon interrogatories and committed until he answers them, or, upon motion of the 
plaintiff, the court may strike out the answer and take the bill as confessed in 
which case the injunction would be granted . f/ 8-122, Code of Virginia; Thomasson v. 
Walker 168 va. 247; Stinson v. Board of Supervisors~3-va~ 362; LYle's Equity Pleadi~g and Practice, /!fl228"-231:-·-- --
9. on May 1, 1968, John Good obtained a judgment for ~5,000 against Sam Park in the 
Circuit Court of Appomattox County, which judgment the Clerk promptly recorded on 
the judgment lien docket~ The judgment did not contain a provision staying its 
effect pending any appeal that might be sought by Park. On June 3rd,Park filed with 
the Circuit Court an appropriate notice of appeal and assignments of error, and 
• 
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delivered a copy thereof to Good. Park now comes to see you and says that he has 
just been served with a subpoena in chancery having an attached bill of complaint 
by which Good has commenced a creditor's suit against Park to obtain a sale of 
timber ]and owned by Park in Appomattox County in satisfaction of the lien of the 
judgment of May 1st. Park asks you what procedural steps he should take in an 
effort to prevent a sale of his timber land in the creditor's suit. 
What should your answer be? 
(CIVIL PROCEDURE) The trial court had control over the judgment for 21 days after 
the date of entry. After this time, however, the trial court would no longer have 
jurisdiction. Therefore, the proper procedural action would be to apply for a writ 
I • 
of supersedeas from the Supreme Court o~ Appeals. The wrlt would operate to stay 
all further proceedings on the judgment :and maintain it at the status quo pending 
the outcome of the appeal. ~ Casualty£~· v. Supervisors, 160 Va. 11; Rule 3:21, 
Rules of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
--- -- __ _,.._ __ 
10. In January, 1952 Conrad, a Florida resident, duly obtained a judgment in 
Florida against Dabney, a West Virginia resident, for damages for personal injuries 
sustained by Conrad and arising out of an accident in Florida. Conrad duly docketed 
the judgment in Florida. The applicable Florida statute provided that a judgment, 
if docketed, is enforceable for 15 years from the date of judgment and cannot 
thereafter be enforced, whereas the corresponding period in Virginia is 20 years. 
Dabney moved to Roanoke, Va., in 1965. Conrad, having failed to enforce the judg-
ment in Florida, brought an action against Dabney on the judgment in the Hustings 
Court of the City of Roanoke,Vao~ on June 20, 1968. 
Dabney consults you as to whether he has any defense to this action. 
How ought you to advise him? 
(CONFLICTS) Dabney has a defense to the action. Since the 15 year statute of limita-
tion3 has run on the Florida judgment, the action would not be allowed in Florida. 
Since the laws of the jurisdiction in which the judgment was rendered bar any action 
on the judgment, the action would also be barred in Virginia. P8-22, Code ~ 
Virginia. 
--~ Z June 1968. 
l~During the morning of May 14, 1968, Henry Frost went to a retail art shop of which 
Sam Pope was the proprietor. He saw displayed for sale several oil paintings, one 
of which was that of a reclining girl painted by a noted French artist. Frost 
feeling that the portrait would be much to the liking of his friend George Neal, 
anc although he had never bought any paintings for Neal, took it upon himself to ask 
p..-;pa the purchase price. When Pope replied that the price was ~~400, Frost said "I 
&~ : aere on behalf of my good friend George Neal, and he has authorized me to say 
that he will purchase this portrait at that pr ice. You can consider it a sale, and 
on tomorrow George will come by and pick up the portrait and pay you the $400. 
F~c3t then left the art shop. Later in the day Hubert Kennedy went to the art shop 
and became charmed by the portrait of the reclining girl. He asked Pope what the 
purchase price was, and Pope, seeing a chance to improve on the price he had quoted 
to Frost, replied that the price was $475. Kennedy thereupon wrote out his check 
for $475 payable to Pope, delivered it, and left the art shop with the painting in 
his possession. When Kennedy was out of sight, Pope telephoned Frost and told him 
to forget the sale to Neal, that he had just sold the portrait to Kennedy. During 
the evening of the same day, Frost told Neal of the arrangements he had made with 
Pope for Neal 's purchase of the portrait of the reclining girl, but did not tell 
Neal of the deal Pope had later had with Kennedy. Neal expressed his delight, and 
the next morning he went to the art shop, tendered Pope his check for $400, and 
asked for the painting. Pope then told him that he had sold the painting to 
Kennedy the day before. Shortly thereafter Neal brought an action against Pope in 
the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond seeking damages of $500 for 
breach of contract. In his motion for judgment, Neal alleged the foregoing facts. 
Pope has demurred to the motio n for judgment. How should the Court rule on the 
demur rei?? 
754. 
(SALES,AGENCY)The court should sustain the demurrer. Until affi:rm.:tnee, t.hP. rP.lA.ti.0n 
of Pope to Neal is similar to that of an offeror to an offeree. Before such time, 
therefore, Pope is free to withdraw either because he discovers that Neal has not 
authorized the transaction or for any other reason. Refusal to perform the obliga-
tions of a purported contract constitutes a withdrawal. 
To constitute ratification, the affirmance of a transaction must occur before the 
other party has manifested his withdraw~l from it either to the purported pri ncipal 
or to the agent, and before the offer o~ agreement has otherwise terminated or been 
discharged. Pope's telephone call to Fro,st was sufficient to constitute a with-
drawal. Restatement of Agency, #88. 
2. Paul North, although nineteen years of age, had all the appearance of an adult. 
He went to a jewelry store owned and operated by Harold East, and expressed his 
admiration of a diamond brooch displayed . for sale at a price of $400. On being 
satisfied that the price was reasonable, :North agreed with East to buy the brooch 
at the listed price, and to make full payment and take delivery during the following 
week. Shortly after North left the store, East learned from another customer that 
North was only nineteen years of age, and that his credit ·Was poor. He now asks 
your advice on whether he is bound by his agreement with North. 
What should your advice be? 
(CONTRACTS;SALESrNFANCY) As a general rule an infant's contract or obligation is 
voidable, not void, and subject to be affirmed or disaff irmed by the infant after 
his arrival at age. The rule applies even though the ot her party deals in ignorance 
of the infancy, and on the fraudulent representation of the infant that he is of 
age. But the defense of infancy is a personal privilege and cannot be interposed by 
a stranger or the other contracting party. 
Mr, East should therefore be advised that hi s contract with North is binding, 
alt hough voidable by North at his option. Since full payment is to be tendered on 
deliv-ery he need not concern himself undul y with the poor credit of his purchaser. 
If at some future date prior to reaching his mayority he decided to void the contract 
the r i ng must be returned before East will be forced to refuntl the purchase price 
to North. For it has with more reason been held by courts of equity that equitable 
relief will not be given to an infant unless he himself does equity by restoring 
what he has received. 23 Va.478, 2 Williston #232,238 3rd Ed.,9 Michie Juris .?l7. 
3o In April of 1968, Ideal Packaging Corp. purchased all the assets of Eastern 
Suppliers,Inc. The contract of sale provided, among other things, "Ideal hereby 
a~<mm~ all the rights and liabilities of Eastern with respect to unfilled ordc1l:a 
f (;J.· the purchase of materials contracted to be sold by Eastern.n James Spencer, 
unknown to Ideal, had been a salesman for Eastern in the Richmond area and, at the 
time of the sale of its assets by Eastern, had procured purchase orders for the sale 
of :1~41,000 of Eastern's merchandi se, which purchas e orders had been accepted by 
Eastern. In his arrangement with Eastern, Spencer was enti tled to receive a commiss-
ion of 10% on each sale. Ttlithin one month after the transfer of assets, Ideal filled 
all the purchase orders whi ch had been obtained by Spencer.Spencer, who had lost 
hi s job as salesman when the assets were transferred by Eastern, r equested of the 
sales manager or Ideal that he be paid commissions totalli ng $4,100. Such payment 
was . r efused. Shortly thereafter, Spencer brought an action agains t I deal in the 
Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond to recover damages of $4,100 for 
breach of contract, and i n his mot ion for judgment alleged the for egoi ng f acts. In 
its grounds of defens e Ideal alleged that Spencer was not enti tled to recover f or 
breach of contract on the grounds (l)Spencer was not a party to the contract for 
sal e of assets;(2) Spencer was nowher e mentioned or referred to in such contract ; 
and (3) Spencer contributed no consi derati on t o such contract. 
Assuming that Ideal's three grounds are correct statements of 
f act, is Spencer enti tled to recover for breach of contract? 
(CONTRACTS)Yes. One does not have to be a formal party t o a contract nor be menti on-
ed therein to have a r ight to sue thereon, nor does t he promise have to be f or the 
sole benefit of the third party who attempts to sue, if it is the intenti on of t he 
formal parties to the contract to make it fo r his direct or substantial benefit. 
• 
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The contract is clear and unambiguous. Whatever the responsibilities of the 
vendor were" with respect to unfilled orders", that is what the defendant assumed 
the totality of the vendor's responsibilities. That one of the responsibilitie:~ of 
vendor " with respect to unfilled orderstt was to pay the plaintiff who had taken 
or supervised the taking of the orders seems clearo That responsibility the defend-
ant unconditionally assumed. When it did so, it did something directly and sub-
st2ntially for the plaintiff's benefit, and the plaintiff was entitled to sue the 
defendant on that contract of assumption. This being so Spencer should be entitled 
to recover for breach of contract. 162 F 2d 870. 
4o Douglas Fox was a widower who resided in Hanover County. Because of ill health 
he moved into a nursing home in Richmond in March of 1965. Realizing that he would 
pro~ably not be able to return to Hanover County, on April 2, 1965, Fox executed 
and delivered to his son Pete a valid deed which, so far as material, provided: 
"I hereby grant and convey to my son Pete Fox in fee simple my farm 
in Hanover Cownty, Va., containing 183 acres, but if my son Pete 
dies without issue surviving him, then such farm shall become the 
property of my son Clyde Fox in fee simple." 
The deed was promptly recorded. Pete Fox had worked on the farm with his father 
and continued to live there after his father moved to the nursing home in Richmond. 
Clyde Fox had not lived on the farm in Hanover County for a number of years and was 
employed as a real estate salesman in the City of Richmond. Clyde Fox died intes-
tate and without issue in 1967, survived by his widow Be~tha. In May of 1968, Pete 
Fox decided to give up farming and, for a valuable consideration, executed and de-
livered a deed to David Black,which deed recited a conveyance of the farm to Black 
for life. Bertha Fox now consults you and asks what rights, if any, she, Pete Fox 
and David Black have in the farm. How should you advise her? 
(FU7URE INTERESTS) I would advise her that Pete Fox had a reversion in fee subject 
to executory limitation; that David Black had a life estate subject to a condition 
subsequent; and that she had a shifting executory interest in fee simple subject to 
defeasance if Pete dies survived by issue. Further that if Pete dies without issue 
she would take the property in fee simple. Restatement of Future Interests 1/108 
Illustration 2 I. 
5. Cassius Smith died in 1962 leaving a holographic will which was duly probated, 
find which provided: 
"This is my last will. I hereby devise and bequeath to my sister 
Shirley Ball all of my property of every kind and description. She 
may deal with and dispose of my property in any way she might 
desire, but if at her death any of my property may remain, it 
shall pass absolutely and in fee simple to my brother Hubert. 
(s) Cassius Smith11 
In May of 1968, Shirley died intestateo By the time of her death she had disposed of 
all property left her by Cassius except 475 shares of the common stock of General 
Motors Corporation. A controversy has now arisen between Hubert Smith and Sammy Ball, 
the only son and sole heir and distributee of Shirley. Both Hubert and Sammy claim 
prior right to the 475 shares of common stock. Which should prevail? 
(PROPERTY,WILLS) Sammy Ball prevails. Since the decision in May v. Joynes decided in 
1871 Virginia courts have consistently held that where a person is given property 
with absolute dominion over it, as in this instance, which is followed by a gift 
over to another 11 if there is anything left11 or like phrase, a fee simple in real 
estate and an absolute estate in personalty passes to the first taker. 
201 Va.355, 185 Va. 82, 184 Va~ 821 • 
6o Sarah Tower was a widow who resided in the City of Fredericksburg. On June 12, 
1968, while walking across a business street intersection in Fredericksburg, Sarah 
Tower was instantly killed when struck by a motor vehicle. Sarah Tower left no will, 
and her sole heir and distributee was her son, Ted Tower. Frank South now comes to 
see you and says that he is the brother of Sarah Tower and has lived with her for 
fourteen years; that on Christmas day in 1967, Sarah Tower delivered to him, and he 
• 
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looked in a trunk in his bedroom, a small gold statue of. tne Virg'in''Mary, that at the 
time she delivered the statue to him Sarah Tower said "You have been more than a 
brother to me while you have lived here and to show my appreciation, I make you a 
gHt of this little statue which onte belonged to our grandmother"; and that Ted 
T~wee is demanding that Frank South deliver over the small statue to him. HG then 
asks you whether he must surrender possession of the statue to Ted Tower. 
What should your answer be? 
(PERSONAL PROPERTY) Code of Virginia, section 55-3 provides the followingz n·No gift 
of any goods or chattels shall be valid unless by deed or will, or unless actual 
possession shall have come to and r~mained with the donee or some person claiming 
under him. If the donor and the donee reside together at the time of the gift, 
possession at the place of their residence shall not be a sufficient possession 
within the meaning of this section." 
The gift must therefore fail since both the decedent and South shared the same 
place of residence and the gift was not conveyed under color of deed. 
1· When Defendant's car stalled at night in the northbound lane of a two-lane high-
way in Shenandoah County, Va., he sent for help to the nea-rtry Zero Filling Station. 
He left his lights burning and turned on his signal light. Good Samaritan and Ever 
Do Well came on the scene and, without any request from the Defendant, offered to 
push his car onto the shoulder of the road. As they got behind the car to push it 
by hand, the truck of Zero Filling Station came up from the rear. The driver stopped 
so suddenly to avoid a collision that equipment and supplies on the truck fell off 
and injured ~od Samaritan. Zero Filling Station settled the resulting claim of 
Good Samaritan for 1~10, 000 and lhrought a suit in a proper Virginia court against 
Defendant for contribution of $51 000. In its complaint Zero alleged the above facts. 
Defendant demurred to the complaint. 
How should the Court rule on the demurrer? 
(TORTS) The Court should sustain the demurrero Before contribution may be had there 
must be a cause of action by the injured person against the alleged joint tortfessor 
from whom contribution is sought. The evidence does not show that Mrs. Bartlett 
breached any duty owed the claimants and therefore, as a matter of law, she was not 
guilty of actionable negligence as far as the claimants are concerned. 
202 Va ~ 527; 207 Va.789. 
8~ Henry Jones, the 18-year-old son of John Jones, lived with his parents at their 
home in Roanoke. Henry borrowed from his father the family automobile to take his 
d2 ce to a water-skiing exhibition at Smith Mountain Lake in nearby Bedford County. 
As they approached their destination, the automobile driven by Henry Jones collided 
in Bedford County with one driven by William Smith. Both cars were completely 
demolished. John Jones instituted an action against William Smith in the Circuit 
Court of Bedford County for the damage to the former's automobile. William Smith 
in a proper counterclaim sought to r ecover for his property damage. 
(a) If the accident was proximately caused by the concurring 
negligence of the two drivers, may John Jones recover from 
William Smith? 
(b) If the sole proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of 
Henry Jones, may William Smith recover from John Jones? 
(TORTS)(a) No. Concurrent negligence arises where the injury is proximately caused 
by the concurrent wrongful act of two or more persons acting independently. If the 
parties are gui lty of concurr i ng negl i gence there c n be no recovery. 
lh9 Vao 740; 2 Michie Juris Auto //47; Bailment 116. 
(b) No. The use by one person of the car of another, for the pleasure, convenience 
or business of the party so us).ng it, does not render the owner liable for injuries 
or damages resulting frorn the negligent use thereof. In the instant case the father 
was not in the car at the time of the accident, nor was it being dri ven on any 
business of his, but , on the contrary, it was being driven by the son for his own 
pleasure and accommodation, with the permission of his father. 170 Va.55 
• 
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9. Plaintiff Administrator brought an action in the Circuit Court of Patrick County, 
Va c, for the alleged wrongful death of his decedent who had been a guest in an 
automobile operated by the Defendant in Patrick County. The evidence showed that 
Defendant's driving ability was impaired by his intoxication, and that, although 
Plaintiff's decedent observed Defendant's careless operation of the car, he con-
t i nued to ride with Defendant after having had a reasonable opportunity to get out 
of the automobile. It was also shown that Plaintiff's decedent was a person of l:>w 
mentality wh() JWas capable of performing only the simplest of tasks, could not be 
·i::YU.sted around machinery, and lacked in:Lative. There was no evidence, howE:~ver, that 
h8 was insane or that a guardian had ever been appointed to care for his person or 
for his property. . 
Defendant moved to strike Plaintiff's 'evidence and ~o enter summary judgment on 
the ground that the evidence showed as a matter of law that Plaintiff's d~~edent 
was guilty of contributory negligence 1hich barred his recovery. In overruling 
the motion the trial court observed that Plaintiff had sought to show thathfuss 
decedent was of low mentality and not able to recognize danger as it existed. The 
trial court concluded, therefore, that whether or not Decedent was guilty of con-
tributory negligence was a jury question. 
On Appeal Defendant assigned as error the action of the trial court in overruling 
his motion for summary judgment. 
How ought the Court of Appeals to rule on the assignment of error? 
(TORTS) The verdict of the jury should be set aside; the judgment appealed from 
should be reversed,,and final judgment should be entered for the defendant. 
It has been held consistently in the Virginia courts that a guest may be guilty 
of contributory negligence if he knows or reasonabl~ should know· that his driver 
had been drinking intoxicating liquor to an extent likely to effect the manner of 
dri ving and voluntarily continues as a passenger after a reasonable opportunity 
to leave the automobile has presented itself. 
Unless the actor is a child or an insane person, the standard of conduct to which 
he must conform for his own protection is that of a reasonable man under like 
cir cumstances. There was no showing here that plaintiff's decedent was insane. 
Mental deficiency which falls short of insanity, however, does not excuse conduct 
which is otherwise contributory negligence. 208 Va o29l; Restatement of Torts #464. 
lOa In her motion for judgment in the Circuit Court of Grayson County, Va., 
Pl aintiff alleged that she ordered a meal in Def endant's r estaurant in Grayson 
Co:mt y on March 1, 1968; that the Defendant impliedly wanranted that the food 
eGrved her was wholesome; that she was served food that was not wholesome; and that 
as a result of eating it she became ill from food poisoning. Defendant demurred to 
t he motion for judgment on the ground that the facts alleged did not entitle 
Plaintiff to recover. How ought the Court to rule on the demurrer? 
(SALES) The court should overrule the defendant's demurrer. The transaction between 
a restaurant keeper and his patron is a sale, implyi ng a warr anty that the f ood is 
whol esome and fit for huma n consumpti on, for the br each of whi ch the restaur ant-
keeper is liable for consequential damages. 207 Va.lOO; Va.Code 8.2-314. 
Section 3 June 1968. 
1. Sam Jones and Jack Smith borrowed ~~1,000 from Quick Finance Coo and gave in re-
t urn their joint promise to repay the loan in 90 days. vn1en the debt became due, 
Jones and Smith defaulted. After much harrassment, Quick Financ e Co. obtained $250 
from Jones in return f or a written release of Jones from any further obligation to 
Qui ck Fi nance Co. It t hen attempt ed to collect $750 from Smi th. When Smi th r ef used 
t o pay more than $500, Qui ck Fi nance Co. threatened to notify Smith's employer of 
this indebtedness. Finally yielding to thi s pressure, Smith paid Quick Finance Co. 
$750 • 
Smith now consults you and asks ~f he i s enti t l ed to r ecover from Jones $250 or 
any part of the money Smith paid Quick Finance Co. How ought you to advise Smith? 
(CREDITORS RIGHTS) Smi th i s entitled to r ecover ~p2SO from the Quick Finance Co. 
or Jones. A creditor may compound or compromi se with any joint contractor or co-
obligor , and rel ease him from all l i abili t y on his contract or obligat i on, wi thout 
i mpairing the contract or obligation as t o the other j oint contractors or co-
• 
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obligors. When such compounding or ~9mpromise is made, the contract or obligation 
shall be credited with a full share fof the party released. Therefore Quick Finance 
Co.'s acceptance of $250 from Jones _1aeted as a full settlement of one half of the 
total outstanding obligations due t~em. This being the ease Smith was only obligat-
ed for $500 to Quick and is entitle4 to recover $250 from them. Further Smith 
may enforce his ~ight of contributi~n against Jones. Va.Code 11-10; 11-11; 11-1!. 
' 2~ On June 1, 1967, Adolph granted ~elda a one-year written option to buy Adolph's 
farm in Roanoke County, Va., for $20,000. For the option Zelda paid Adolph $500, 
to be applied against the purchase price if she exercised the option. Zelda 
promptly recorded the option. On April 1, 1968, Adolph died intestate survived by 
his son, Sam, and his daughter, Dora. After AdolPh's death, and within one year 
from the date of the option, Zelda notified Adolph's Administrator that she elected 
to exercise the option and requested the Administrator to execute a deed to Zelda, 
which he did. 
Five years before Adolph's death, Happy Finance Co. obtained a $500 judgment 
against son, Sam, which it duly docketed in Roanoke County on June 10, 1963. The 
Success Nati~nal Bank obtained a $12,000 judgment against daughter, Dora, in 1964, 
which it duly docketed in Roahoke County on October 10, 1964. 
At the time of his death, Adolph owed Cassius $3,000 s~oured by a vendor's lien 
on the farm which Cassius conveyed to him in 1960, said deed hawing been promptly 
recorded. He also was indebted to Citizens Bank for $7,000 secured by a deed of 
trust on his farm, the deed of trust having been duly recorded August 1, 1963. 
Quick Cash Loan Co. had obtained a judgment against Adolph for $41 000 which had been 
properly docketed in Roanoke County on Feb. 13, 1964. 
Which of the foregoing debts, if any, must be satisfied to pass an unencumbered 
title to Zelda? 
(CREDITOR'S RIGHTS) When any deceased person shall have bona fide sold any land and 
shall have given a written contract to the purchaser to convey the same and the 
written contract has been duly recorded in the county or corporation wherein the 
land is situated, his executor or administrator may, upon the payment of the price 
or the balance thereof remaining unpaid and a full compliance with the conditions 
of the written contract, execute a deed to the purchaser conveying such real estate 
as shall be specified in such written contract and such deed shall convey the 
title as fully as if it had been executed by the deceased obligor. Cassius's $) 1000 
vendor's lien, the Citizen Bank's deed o! trust for $7,000, and the $41 000 judgment 
~.i<m obtained by Quick Cash Loan Co. must be satisfied to pass unencumbered title 
·lio Zelda. Va. Code 1164-138. 
3o H and W, residents of Shenandoah County, Va., had been married for three years 
when W confessed to H that recently she had committed adultery. He promptly took 
her to her father's home and told him that they were separating because he believed 
her pregnant by another man. The next day H and W consulted Lawyer and had him pre-
pare a separation agreement which was never actually executed. Four days after she 
had confessed her adultery, H and W resumed marital relations. He continued to be 
suspicious that his wife was pregnant by another man and had her examined by two 
Jhysieians to ascertain whether she was pregnant. The reports were inconclusive. 
About tw9 weeks after they had resumed their marital relations, H left W intending 
never to return. He brought a suit for divorce from her in the Circuit Court of 
Shenandoah County ~n the ground of adultery and she filed an answer setting forth 
condonation and a crossbill in which she prayed for a divorce on the ground that he 
l.ad willfully deserted her. How ought the Chancellor to decide the case on the 
above facts:(FAMILY LAW) When the suit is for divorce for adultery, the divorce 
shall not be granted if it appears that the parties voluntarily cohabited after the 
knowledge of the faot of adultery, or that it occurred more than S years before the 
institution of the suit, or that it was committed by procurement or connivance of 
the plaintiff. 
In the present case it appears without contradiction that the husband knew of h ~ ~ 
infidelity and that after this knowledge of the fact of adultery on her part he re-
sumed voluntary cohabitation with her. Thus the Chancellor should decide that the 
husband's condonation of the wife's adulterous acts bar his ri8hts to a --
• 
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divorce on the ground of adultery . Further he should find that the husband willfully 
des~rted his wife without just case. va.code 20-94; 206 Va. 535. 
4. On February 1, 1966, Contractor entered into a written contract with Owner for 
the construction of a home for the latter in Tazewell County, Va., for $30,000. On 
the same date Contractor, as principal, and American, as surety, executed a per-
formance bond payable to Owner conditio~ed upon the faithful performance by Con-
tractor of its obligations under the co~tract with Owner. Also, as collateral 
security for the faithful performance of its contract with Owner, Contractor assign-
ed to Trust Co., as Trustee, 100 shares !of the common stock of XYZ Corporation, 
which then had a market value of $5,000. Contractor became insolvent and ceased 
work on the home on Sept. 15, 1966. Owner completed construction on October 20, 1967, 
At a cost of $35,000. Owner then instit~ted an action against American on its bond 
in the Circuit Court of Tazewell County !for $5,000. American defended on the ground 
that it was released from liability on the bond because Owner had failed to proceed 
against the stock of XYZ Corporation, which was worth $5,000 at the time of Con-
tractor's default but which was worthless because of the insolvency of XYZ Corpora-
tion when suit was instituted against American. 
How aught the Court to rule on this defense? 
(CREDITOR'S RIGHTS)The court should rule against the defense. Mere in action on 
Owner's part does not relieve the surety of its obligation to perform under the 
terms of the bond. Owner was under no obligation to exhaust remedies against 
the Contractor before resorting to American. 203 Va. 802. 
5.Debtor owed a number of people money. One of them, Vigilant, pressed him for pay-
ment and threatened legal action. Thereupon, Debtor wrote Vigilant: 11Austin owes 
me more than I owe you, and if you won't sue me now I will pay you out of that 
money as soon as I get it ... Vigilant accepted and relied on Debtor's written 
promise but while he waited to receive the money, Wldeawake, another creditor of 
Debtor, obtained from Debtor a written assignment of the whole amount owed by 
Auctin. Vigilant claims that Debtor's letter constituted an equitable assignment 
to him of enough of the Austin debt to satisfy his claim. Is this correct? 
(EQUITY) No. A mere promise or agreement to pay a debt out of a designated fund, 
when received, does not give an equitable lien upon the fund, nor operate as an 
· equitable assignment of it. Something more is necessary. To constitute an equitable 
assignment there must be an assignment or trans~er of the fund or some definite 
por tion of it, so that the person owing the debt or holding the fund on which the 
order's drawen can safely pay the order, and is compellable to do so, though for-
bidden by the drawer.Here the letter to Vigilant failed to satisfy these criteria. 
206 Va.673;94 va.741. 
6p Cantrell was the trustee in a deed of trust on Blackacre executed by Blackford, 
which secured South the payment of a note made by Blackford for $101 000. No examina-
tion was made of the title to Blackacre. One day Cantrell noticed in the Clerk's 
Office a judgment in favor of Sharpe against Blackford for ~~5,000 which had been 
docketed before the deed of trust was executed. Blackford ~as in financial diffi-
culty and it was questionable whether his property w ould be sufficent to satisfy 
his debts. Knowing all these facts, Cantrell approached Sharpe and offered to buy 
the judgment at a substantial discount. After some discussion, Sharpe sold and 
assigned to Cantrell the judgment for $3,500 cash, which Cantrell paid from his own 
funds. Shortly after this, South requested Cantrell to foreclose the deed of trust. 
The sale was advertised and conducted in strict accordance with the terms of the 
deed of trust, and Blackaore was sold to Purchaser for $7,500 net, cash,out of 
which Cantrell paid to himself $5,750, the then principal and interest of the 
Sharpe judgment, and tendered the remainder to South on the note secured by the 
deed of trust. But South having just learned of the Sharpe judgment and its assign-
ment to Cantrell, demanded payment of the entire net. of $7 ,5oo. Is he entitled to it:l 
(EQUITY) No. Cantrell is only entitled to $3,500 and South to the remaining ~~4,ooo. 
Cantrell will not be allowed to take advantage of his fiducary relati onship with 
South. Therefore he may not recover more than he paid for its purchase. 
1 Glenn on Equity #80 Paragraph 6. 760. 
7. Barrister was guardian for Ward. Borrower approac-hed Barrister and said, "These 
banks won't make me a 5 year loan at 6% interest(the then l~gal rate). If you can 
get me a 5 year loan at 6%, I will sec,ure it by a first lien on real estate worth 
double the loan, pay you a fee of $500 and all costs attending the execution and 
recordation of the deed of trust." Barrister, as guardian, having on hand ininvested 
funds belonging to Ward made the loan as guardian and collected the $500 fee for him· 
self. Ward learned of the transaction and contended that Barrister pay to the . 
guardianship this $500. Is this contention sound? 
(EQUITY) Yes. Nothing in the law of fiduciary trusts is better settled than that the 
trustee shall not be allowed to advantage himself in dealings with the trust estate. 
He should not be allowed to serve himself under the pretense of serving his cestui 
que trust. This rule is founded on true principles. That is, that the trustee has no 
right to derive any benefit or advantage from the trust fund out of all his skill 
and labor in the management of the trust must be directed to the advancement of the 
interest of his castui que trust, and the other is that the trustee will not be per-
mitted to create in himself an interest opposite to that of the party for whom he 
acts. 154 Va. 751. 
8. The third clause of a will provides: "I bequeath to my son, John, $5,000 to be 
paid out of the money owed me by William Jones.n 
The testator in his lifetime collected and spent the money owed him but he had had 
other stocks and bonds worth $20,000 more than his debts. 
What rights, if any, has John in this surplus? 
(WILLS) John has the right to collect the entire $5,000. The legacy here is a demon-
strative legacy and as such the legatee will be permitted to receive the $5,000 out 
of the general assets of the estate. 20 Michie 383. 
9. Thomas Smith, aged 20, was killed in a motor accident. Among his effects was 
found the following paper, all in his handwriting. 
~I, Thomas Smith, unmarried, make and declare this to be my will. I give my 
automobile to my only brother, $1,000 to my only sister, and my house and lot 
I bought to my widowed mother. Given under my hand this 13th day of May, 1968. 
Thomas Smith." 
At the time of his death, Thomas owned an automobile, had $1,500 in the bank anu 
owned a residence in Roanoke. What are the respective rights, if any, in the 
p:..· .Jperty of: (A) The brother; {B) The sister; (C) The mother? 
' .  WILLS) Section 64-49 of the Code of Virginia states, "No parson of unsound mind or 
r•.nder the age of 21 years shall be capable of making a will, except that minors 18 
years of age or upwards may by will dispose of personal estate." 
(a) Under the above section of the code the brother would take the automobile 
(personalty), under the terms of the will. 
(b) The sister would take the $1,000 bequeathed in the will. Here again we are 
dealing with personalty and the code section presents no obstacle. 
(c) The devise of the house and lot to the mother would fail since the testator 
was under the age of 21~ Section 64-1, however, provides that realty will 
descend and pass to the father and mother or survivor, where there no 
children, if the person having title to such real estate shall die intestate. 
W1th respect to the real estate the decedent is presumed to have died 
intestate and therefore the realty will pass to the mother. 
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10. Ike and Pike agreed to go in the clothing business together, so each put Up 
• t-:to,ooo and they opened up a store. At first each devoted all his time to the businesn 
but later 011, Ike acquired other interests and only came to the store on Saturdays o:r 
unusually bu~ days. Pike has just died ~nd his widow asks you the following ~questions~ 
(1) Who is entitled to settle up the business if it is not continued? 
(2) She would like to take Pike's placq and continue the business but Ike won't 
agree to it. Can she force him to do sof 
(3) If the business is closed out, will Pike's executor be allowed to collect any 
pay for Pike's services to the business~ How ought you to answer her? 
(BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS;PARTNERSHIP) Ike ~ Section 50-37 of the Code of Virginia ex-
pressly provides, "Unless otherwise agr~ed the partners who have not wrongfully 
dissolved the partnership, or the legal representative of the last surviving partner, 
not bankrupt, have the right to wind up the partnership affairs; provided, however, 
that any partner, his legal representative, or his assignee, upon cause shown, may 
obtain winding up by the court. 
(2) No. One of the chief characteristics of a partnership relation is that it is 
created only by the voluntary contract of the parties. A partnership relation does 
not arise by operation of law and no new partner can be introduced into a partner-
ship except by consent of the members. 40 Am.Jur. ,17 Partnership. 
(3) No. In the absence of a contract, express or implied, there is no entitlement 
allowed for compensation beyond the partner's share of the profits for services 
rendered by him to the partnership business. 4 Am.Jur.#120 Partnership. 
4 June 1968. 
1. Tom, Dick and Harry were good friends and frquent drinking companions. One night, 
after a few rounds of highballs, they went from Alexandria to Washington in Tom's 
car. While in Washington they imbibed several drinks and then started back home. 
Dick insisted that Tom was too drunk to drive but Harry said, "you are just chicken, 
Tom can drive better drunk than you can sober, let him alone. On the return journey 
the car struck a utility pole in Alexandria and Dick was killed. Tom ~as indicted 
for involuntary manslaughter. On the trial Tom's attorney asked for an instruction 
to t he effect that if Dick knew of Tom's condition, or by reasonable observation 
ought to have known it, then he was guilty of contributory negligence in continuing 
to ride with him, and the jury should find Tom not guilty. 
Ought this instruction to have been granted? 
·(CRINIMAL LAW) The instruction should not have been given as contributory negligence 
is not a defense to a criminal action. "Contributory negligence h~s no place in a 
cas8 of involuntary manslaughter. This case is one of the State against the de-
fendant, and not one of a party seeking damages in a civil action. The conduct of 
the decedent may have a material bearing on the degree of the defendant's guilt,but 
if the criminal negligence of the latter is found to be the cause of the death, the 
defendant is criminally responsible, whether the decedent's failure to use due care 
contributed to the injury or not •• n Bell v. Commonwealth, 170 Va.597. 
2oPedestrian was walking along a dark street one night when Footpad stepped f~om 
behind a tree, po~nted a pistol at him and said, 11Give me $10 or take what this gun 
can give you • ., Pedestrian replied, 11 ! haven't but fifty cents on me, you can have 
that." Footpad then said, 11Hand it over and also that sporty tie clip you are 
wearing, it ought to be worth a hundred dollars." Pursuant to the demand, Pedestrian 
handed over the fifty cents and the tie clip, and Footpad fled but was later 
arrested. 
Of·JWhat offense, if any, was he guilty, assuming that the tie clip was 
costume jewelry and only worth a few cents? 
(CRIMI NAL LA~ Footpad was guilty of robbery. Robbery is defined as the felonious 
taking of money or goods of value from the person of another or in his presence, 
against his will, by force or putting him in fearG Consequently, robbery contains 
all of the elements of petit larcency and assault, both of which Footpad committed. 
Since Footpad is guilty of robbery, the other offenses merge with the robbery 
offense . 46 Am.Jur, 139. 
--
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3. On March 24m 1967 Lucky, a Virginia citizen, was indicted in North Carolina for 
driving an automobile while intoxicated. Lucky was prosecuted on the indictment in 
the April, 1967, criminal term by the Superior Court of Albemarle County, N.C., 
but when the jury failed to agree upon a verdict, the judge declared a mistrial and 
ordered the case continued until the next term. At the August, 1967, term, the 
Commonwealth's Attorney requested the Court to enter a nolle prosequi with leave to 
reopen the case, which procedure Lucky's attorney vigorously opposed. Although the 
Commonwealth's Attorney offered no p~rticular justification for the nolle prosequi 
order, the Court granted the State's 'motion over defendant's objection:-According 
to the Constitution of North Carolina, when a Commonwealth's Attorney does not 
desire to proceed further with a prosecution, he may take a nolle prosequi with leave, 
which allows him to have the case restored at any future time for trial. While the 
prosecution against the accused is so ~ suspended, the eonstitutional provision allows 
him to go "whithersoever he will" without bond or restriction. 
Lucky now consults you and wants to know if he has been deprived of any constitu-
tional right, and, if so, what right. How should you advise him? 
(CONSTITUTIONAL LAW)I would advise him that he had been deprived of his right to a 
speedy trial as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the u. s. 
The Sixth Amendment is made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth amendment. 
The fact that he is at liberty to go where he desires does not remove the threat of 
criminal prosecution that is hanging over his head. "By indefinitely prolonging this 
oppcession ••• the criminal procedure condoned ••• by the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina clearly denies the petioner the right to a speedy trial which we hold is 
guaranteed to him by the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the u. S. 11 
Klopfer v. ~ Carolina 18 L.Ed.2d. 1 • 
.. 4. Marilyn Easy, somewhat intixicated after a day of drinking while working as a 
barmaid in Joe's Bar in Norfolk, Va., called Cari-U Taxicab Co. and requested a cab 
to take her home. Pursuant to this request, Cari-U sent its cab and driver, Will 
Triet, to take her to her home. During the course of the drive, Will made an amorous 
adv~nce to Marilyn, which she rejected. Will, who was not a person easily defeated 
in the quest of an objective, struck Marilyn several times in the hope that this 
would make her realize the opportunity that she was passing up. Upon realizing that 
he had been overzealous and that Marilyn was injured because of his ~owsg fue took 
her to Norfolk General Hospital, where she was admitted and treated. 
Marilyn brought an action to recover damages from Cari-U Taxicab Co. and Will 
Triet on account of injuries received as the result of the attack made upon her by 
Willo Cari-U filed grounds of defense deyning its liability and, together with a 
supporting affidavit, denied that Will in committing the assault was either acting 
as an employee of the defendant Cari-U or acting within the scope and course of his 
employment and that therefore Cari-U was not liable for ~ll's conduct. 
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence, which showed the foregoing facts 
of Will's attack upon her and her damage, Cari-U moved to strike the plaintiff's 
evidence and enter summary judgment for it alone. 
How ought the Court rule on Cari-U's motion? 
(AGENCY) The motion should be denied. The Cari-U Co. would be liable for the assault 
by its employee upon a passenger under the special liability imposed upon common 
carriers. "It is firmly established that a passenger is entitled to recover damages 
for mistreatment on the part of an employee of a common carrier not only where the 
assault was in the line of the employee's duty, but also where it was merely that of 
an individual and entirely disconnected with the performance of the employee's 
duties, if it occurred on the carriers vehicle or during the existence of the 
carrier-passenger relationship." Simpson v. Taxicab Corp, 203 Va.S92 • 
5. Harried, a director of Aplha, Inc., a Virginia corporation, consults you and 
advises that a group of unhappy shareholders of Alpha, Inc., has caused a meeting 
of shareholders to be called for July 3rd expressly for the purpose of ousing hi m 
from the board of directors. Harried advise~S that there is just one class of share-
holders of Alpha, Inc.; that he and the other four directors of Alpha, Inc., were 
elected six months ago for a two-year term; and that he is sure there is no reason 
• 
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for the shareholders to be dissatisfied with his performance as a director 
Harried asks you if there is any chance that the shareholders of Alpha, Inc., 
at such a meeting can prevent him from serving the remaining eighteen months of his 
term as a director, if he can show at the meeting that he has performed well and 
has done nothing to deserve being ousted. How should you advise him? 
(CORPORATIONS) I would advise him that his best course of action would be to attempt 
to persuade the stockholders not to vote against him. The stockholders have the 
right, however, to remove Harried from his office, with or without cause. "At a 
meeting called expressly for that purpose, any director may be removed, with or 
without cause, by a vote of stockholders holding a majority of the shares entitled 
to vote at an election of directors of the class or classes by which such directors 
were elected •• " #13.1-42 ~£!Virginia. 
6. Leonard, a director of Omega, Inc., a Virginia corporation, consults you and 
advises that recently the board of directors of Omega, Inc., declared a dividend, 
which upon payment, rendered Omega insolvent. Although no member of the Omega 
board of directors actually checked any financial records or statements and none of 
them asked any of the officers about the state of the corporation's finances, each 
of the directors believed that the company was in good financial shape and that the 
dividend would increase the sale value of the stock of Omega, Inc. Although 
Leonard thought the corporation was in good financial shape, he voted against de-
claring the dividend as he preferred to use such sum for funded reserves, and his 
vote was so noted in the minutes of the meeting. 
Leonard asks you if the creditors of Omega, Inc., have any right to recover from 
him or any of the other directors for all or any part of the dividend paid. 
How should you advise him? 
(CORPORATION) I would tell Leonard that he is not liable to the creditors for the 
diYidend so declared as he dissented from the vote and had his dissenting vote 
recorded in the minutes of the meeting. The other directors who voted for the 
dividend wonld be jointly and severally liable to the creditors for the amount of 
th~ dividend. They would be entitled to contributions from the stockholders who 
re~eived the dividends in the proportion of the dividend received by each stock-
holder. 
If the directors had relied in good faith on the financial statement of the 
corporation represented to them to be'correct by the president or other officer of 
the corporation having charge of the books of account, the directors would not 
h<ne been liable. #13.1-44, ~ of Virginia. 
7o George Gottrocks had grown very fond of his chauffeur's son, Tom Timid, and was 
impressed with Tom's intelligence and his desire for an education. One day he called 
his chauffeur, Nere Timid, into his study and presented him with a check for 
$10,000 payable to the order of ":.Nre Timid, Trustee11 • George Gottrocks told Nere 
Timid that the check was for his son's first year's tuition at Gold Coast Univer-
sity. Nere Timid thanked George Gottrocks graciously and departed. That night, Nere 
Timid purchased around-the-world tickets on a cruise ship for himself and his 
mistress and paid for them by the check given him by George Gottrocks by endorsing 
and delivering the same to World Cruise, Inc. George Gottrocks learned of this 
within several days and he called his attorney and asked if there was not some way 
he could properly instruct his bank to refuse to honor this check inasmuch as it 
had been payable to Nere Timid as trustee. How should the attorney advise him? 
(TRUSTS,N8GOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS)Gottrocks is liable on the check and cannot refuse 
p~yment when it is presented by World Cruise,Inc. World Cruise Inc. is a holder in 
due course of the check. There was not sufficient notice to World Cruise to put 
them on notice that Timid was in breach of his fiduciary relationship. The mere 
indication on the face of the instrument that Timid was a fiduciary was not 
sufficient notice. Since the instrument was payable to 11 Nere Timid,Trustee", it was 
payable to Timid and could be negotiated by him. Gottrocks, therefore, could not 
refuse to honor the check when presented by World Cruise,Inc. His cause of action 
would ~ie against Timid for breach of his fiduciary capacity. H#8.3-304(2),8.3-
304(4e), 8.3-117, ~~Virginia. 
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8. Fred Fraud presents to Woebegon Manufacturing Co. a fraudulent bill for 1,000 
widgets that he contends were delivered by him to Woebegon's Florida subsidiary. 
Relying on the apparent authenticity of the statement, Woebegon delivers to Fred 
its promissory demand note payable to Bearer for $500. Fred, who has been hounded 
by many of his creditors, delivers the note to Shalby Suit Co. as payment for 
several sets of formal attire, which he had purchased for use at the annual widget 
convention at the Homestead the pr·e:vious summer. Shabby Suit Co., in turn, discounts 
the note to Claude Fraud, Fred's brpther, who had full knowledge of the fraudulent 
transaction with Woebegon. Claude presents the note to Woebegon and demands payment, 
Woebegon having in the meantime learned of Fred's fraudulent misrepresentation. 
Is Woebegon liable to Claude on the note? 
(NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS) Woebegon is liable to Claude on the note. When Fred trans-
ferred the instrument to Shabby Suit Co., which took the note in good faith, for 
value, and without notice of Fred's fraud, it became a holder in due course of the 
instrument. When the company transferred the note to Claude, the transfer vested in 
Claude all of the rights the company had to enforce the note. Claude was not a 
party to the original fraud, even though he knew of it, and thus by taking the note 
from a holder in due course, he cuts off any defense that Woebegon might have. 
#8.)-291, ~~Virginia. 
9.Alvin Applicant, a resident of Virginia, applied in Virginia for a policy of life 
insurance on his life and as beneficiary listed Alma Applicant, his wife. In an-
other section of the application, he stated that he was married to Alma and the 
marriage ceremony was performed in Bristol, Va., in 1961. 
Unknown to Alvin, Alma had married Traveler in 1959, but Traveler had deserted 
her several weeks after the marriage and neither Traveler nor Alma had ever filed 
for a divorce. Alma and Alvin subsequently met, and a marriage ceremony was per-
formed in Bristol in 1961, and thereafter they lived together as husband and wife 
in that City. 
Pursuant to, and relying on Alvin's application, Insurance Company issued a 
pol icy of insurance on his life with Alma as his beneficiary. Thereafter, Alvin 
was killed in an accident and Alma applied for the proceeds of the insurance policy. 
Insurance Company then learned for the first time of Alma's prior marriage and 
denied coverage, and Alma filed an action at law against it. 
At the trial of the case, the above facts were proven and, in addition, Alma 
t estified that she had never told Alvin of her previous marriage and that Alvin 
kn ~w nothing of it. Insurance Co. called several of its off icers and actuaries who 
t estified that they would not have insured Alvin had he revealed that he was living 
wi th Alma out of wedlock because this was material to the risk and increased the 
possibility of violent or premature death. At the conclusion of all the evidence, 
Insurance Co. moved the court to strike plaintiff's evidence and enter summary 
judgment in its behalf. How should the court rule? 
(INSURANCE) The court should rule in favor of the insurance company and enter 
summary judgment for it. A misrepresentation in an application for insurance will 
not bar recovery unless it is proven that the misrepresentation was material to 
the risk. In this case, the misrepresentation that the plaintiff was decedent's 
wife was material to the risk, as the insurance company would not have i ssued t he 
policy if they had known that plaintiff and decedent were not l egally man and wif e. 
Therefore, the policy was void. #38.1-336, Code of Virginia; Chitwood v. Prudenti al 
Ins. Co., 206 Va. 314; Hawkeye Security Ins:-GO. v. Govt. Employees Ins. Co. 
'207 va. 944. --- - - ---
10. In 1968, ni ne individuals, all of whom ar e residents of the State of Virginia, 
decided to form a corporation nami ng themselves as the only stockholders. One of 
the more astute individuals of the group has pointed out that s i nc e the corporat i on 
could expect a yearly income, which all nine contemplat e being distributed to them, 
the net income of the corporation mi ght be subjected to double taxation in that a 
corporate i ncome tax might be imposed upon the income earned by t he corpora t i on 
and another tax imposed upon the individuals on the dividends from this i ncome 
being distributed to them as stockholders. The group consults you and asks if 
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they can form this corporation so that the double taxation can be legally avoided. 
How should you advise them? 
(TAX) As the corporation is a small corporation(less than ten stockholders), it 
can, with the consent of all of the stockholders file an election under Subchapter 
S of the Internal Revenue Code. While this election is in eff ect, the corporation 
is not subject to the corporate income tax, the accumulated earning tax, or the 
personal holding company tax; and the corporate income, whether distributed or not, 
is taxed to the shareholders. Subchapter S, Internal Revenue Code. 
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1. Witness Wllson testified on behalf of plaintiff in an action for breach of a sales 
contract. While testifying, Wilson \stated that he could not remember a certain 
sequence of events with exact dates and times as to deliveries. Upon inquiry by 
plaintiff's counsel, he stated that he believed his memory could be refreshed if he 
could look at certain notes which he had in a folder. When he started to testify, 
defense counsel objected and it was : shown that the notes to which he had referred 
were a list of dates, times, and places of deliveries. On being questioned out of 
the presence of the jury, Wilson admitted that the information contained in the 
notes was obtained from various records over none of which he had custody or control 
aad the actual memorandum to which he referred was not written by him but was, in 
fact, written by a secretary in a plant where he worked, but he stated that after 
consulting this memorandum, he remembered the dates, times, places, and also the 
details of his handling of the deliveries referred to. 
How should the Court rule on defendant's objection? 
(EVIDENCE) The court should overrule the objection. The testimony is present memory 
refreshed rather than past memory recollected. If a witness is unable to recall a 
fact about which he is questioned, and is asked to look at a writing containing an 
account of the fact, he may then be able to ~tay "I now remember the fact"; and 
from there proceed to testify from an independant recollection. This is termed 
refreshing the recollection, and any writing which stimulates and revives a recoll-
ection may be used to refresh the memory. It is of no import who prepared the 
writing or whether or not the writing itself would be admissable into evidence. 
He, however, must speak from his own recollection thus refreshed, and not from the 
source of the refreshment. Cross-examination is, of course, always available to 
expose any improper practice or suspicious circumstances. 52 Va.527; 139 Va.748; 
Nash,Evid 1/27. 
2. As the result offalling from 'a hotel window, Cain was killed on March 17,1968, 
and was survived by his widow and their daughter. The daughter was a sixteen-year-
old invalid, confined to an institution at considerable monthly expense because of 
an incurable disease. Although Cain ostensibly lived with his wife and used a 
portion of his wages to help support the family, he was a heavy drinker and 
~eriodically stayed for weeks at a time with his secretary at her apartment, and 
three times within the last two years, his wife had sworn out a warrant charging 
him with physical assault. 
On November 20, 1968, in the Circuit Court of Albermarle County, Cain's adminis-
tra~or brought an action at law against Waldorf Hotel Corporation under the 
Virginia wrongful Death Act seeking a reaovery for Cain's wrongful death. During 
the trial, Mrs. Cain testified that the family had sustained a great personal loss 
because of Cain's death and testified in detail as to the invalid daughter's 
situation as stated above. Defense counsel objected to the testimony about the 
daughter. Defendant offered evidence as to the above-described habits and activities 
of Cain, to which testimony plaintiff's counsel objected. 
How should the Court rule on: 
(a) Defendant's objection to Mrs . Cain's testimony concerning the daughter? 
(b) Plaintiff's objection to defendant's proffered evidence? 
(EVIDENCE)(a) Evidence of extraordinary support costs for defendant children in a 
wrongful death action are inadmissable. The details of the condition of dependency 
cannot be shown. The court should therefore sustain the objection. 
(b) The court should overrule the objection. Evidence that the husband and wife 
were living apart at the time of death and desertion and adultery are admissable 
on the issue of quantum of damages since the wife introduced evidence as to the 
loss sustained. 199 Va. 817; 197 Va. 112. 
• 
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3. A judgment was entered by the Circuit :court of Greene County, Va., against Bowl-
ing Green Construction Corporation on June 3, 1968. Within sixty days thereafter 
counsel for the Company filed in the Clerk's Office notice of appeal and assign-
ments of error. The Trial Judge signed the transcript of the evidence and other 
incidents of the trial within sixty days 1of the final judgment order, after timely 
notice had been given to o~posing counsel that the transcript would be submitted to 
the Trial Judge for signature. On Sept. ~5, 1968, counsel for Bowling Green Con-
struction Corporation filed with the Cle~k of the Trial Court a written designation 
of the portions of the record that the Company desired printed, and on Sept. 27, 
1968, counsel for the appellant notified 'the Clerk of the Trial Court to transmit 
the record to the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Appeals in Richmond. The Clerk 
transmitted the record pursuant to this ~equest and it was received in the Clerk's 
Office, in Richmond, on Sept. 30, 1968. ¢ounsel for appellee in the Appellate 
Court moved to dismiss the appeal. How should the Court rule on the motion? 
(VIRGINIA APPELLATE PROCEDURE) The court should sustain the motion to dismiss. 
Rule 5:1,#6(a) provides that, "not less than twenty days before the record is 
transmitted(to the clerk or a justice of the appellate court), counsel for appellant 
shall file with the clerk(of the trial court) a designation of the parts of the 
record he wishes printedo 11 
Rule 5:1 #7 imposes a duty upon the clerk of the trial court to transmit the 
record only on request of appellant's counsel after twenty days or at the request 
of both counsel within less time. 
In the case at bar the record was not designated for printing 20 days prior to 
the time required and therefore the court must dismis the action. Rule 5:1 ##6,7. 
4. On Dec. 1, 1968, plaintiff Frazier instituted an action at law in the Circuit 
Court of Albemarle County against defendant Truck Corporation by a motion for 
jud~nent, the body of which alleged' 
1. That plaintiff purchased from defendant on January 1, 1968 at a 
price of $8,000, payable $500 per month, a Bull Pup truck, which 
defendant knew was to be used in plaintiff's business of hauling 
trailers for long distances, and defendant expressly warranted to 
the plaintiff that the truck was free of all defects in material 
and workmanship. 
2- That after three months' use, the truck proved to be defective 
in material and workmanship and would not perform as specified and 
defendant refused to remedy the said defect, so that the truck was 
useless for plaintiff's business. 
3. that there was no specific provision in the sales contract for 
repossession of the vehicle for non-payment. 
4o That because plaintiff refused to pay $500 per month, subsequent 
to March 1, 1968, the defendant did wrongfully and by force take the 
truck from the plaintiff's premises on June 1, 1968. 
5. That plaintiff had been damaged in the sum of $25,000 because of 
defendant's breach of its express warranty and because of defendant's 
wrongful repossession of the said truck. 
What is the proper pleading which defendant's counsel should file? 
(CIVIL PROCEDURE) Defendant's counsel should demur to the complaint. Causes of 
action in tort and contract should not be joined in the same notice of motion or 
declaration. They are not of the same nature. Plaintiff should be made to separate 
his causes of action. 186 Va.85; 205 Va. 579. 
5. Defendant rented to plaintiff a house and garage in Norfolk, Va., with the 
responsibility of maintaining the premises remaining with the defendant. As a 
result of the negligent maintenance by the defendant of the furnace, located in the 
garage, an explosion occurred on Feb. 1, 1966, and plaintiff's automobile and 
certain personal effects were destroyed or damaged and plaintiff, who was in the 
garage at the time of the explosion, sustained personal injuries. 
On January 25, 1968, plaintiff instituted an action at law in the Circuit Court 
of the City of Norfolk seeking a recovery for personal injuries sustained as a 
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result of the explosion. After issue ~as joined, a trial on the merits on March 30, 
1968, resulted in a jury finding the defendant liable and rendering a verdict for 
the plaintiff in the sum of $10,000, 1n which judgment for the plaintiff was 
enteredq 
On June 30,1968, plaintiff instituted an action at law against the defendant in 
the Circuit Court of the City of Norfdlk seeking a recovery of damages in the sum of 
$4,000 for the destruction of his automobile, $400 for loss of use of his automobile~ 
~p500 for damage to certain of his clothes, and $2 1 000 for damages to his home 
machine shop and tools, alleging that such damages resulted from the said explosion, 
it being admitted that these damages were existent and ascertainable at the time 
plaintiff instituted and tried the prior action. The motion for judgment ala~ 
alleged the judgment previously obtained and pleaded the same as a prior finding 
of liability on the defendant so that the issue of liability was res adjudicata 
and that plaintiff was therefore entitled tQ a trial on the issue-of damages only. 
Defendant filed responsive pleadings setting forth the following alternative 
contentions: 
(a) Plaintiff's second cause of action should be dismissed since has but one 
cause of action for all damages sustained as a result of the explosion, 
and having failed to allege and prove property damages in existence at the 
time of the first cause of action, he is precluded from later instituting 
a cause of action for the same. 
(b) If the court should hold that plaintiff is entitled to proceed with the 
second cause of action, all issues, including the issue of _liability, 
should be litigated; otherwise, defendant would be deprived of a fair trial. 
Hmr should the Court rule on each of defendant's contentions'? 
(CIVIL PROCEDURE)(a) A single tort injury, resulting in damage to both person and 
property, gives rise to two distinct causes of action and recovery in one is no 
bar to an action subsequently commenced for the other. Although this is the minority 
rule it is the rule in the state of Virginia. 
(b) The defendant is estopped from denying liability since that issue was settled 
at the first trial and is now res judicata. The plaintiff is therefore entitled to 
a trial on the issue of damages alone. 189 Va. 1; Va.B-24. 
6.Plaintiff, a lifetime resident of Richmond, Va., was injured in an automobile 
accident occurring in Richmond on Nov.l, 1967, when his automobile was in a 
collision with one driven by defendant, a citizen of North Carolina. 
Plaintiff brought an action on January 5, 1968, in the Law and Equity Court of the 
City of Richmond seeking a recovery C'~f $25,000 f~:r personal injuries. After issue 
wns joined, the case was set for trial for April 5, 1968, and on the morning of 
trial~ plaintiff's counsel moved the Court for entry of an order of nonsuit. De-
fendant's counsel objected, stating that the case had been set for trial for several 
months and defendant had come from North Carolina at considerable trouble and ex-
pense, that an expert witness had been engaged and brought to court at considerable 
expense, that one of the key eyewitnesses to the accident was leaving the country 
the next day, and that he, defendant's counsel, had received no prior notice of 
plaintiff's motion for a nonsuit. Plaintiff's counsel stated that he had not pre-
pared fully for trial and simply did not want to try the case on that date. Over 
defendant's objection, the Court entered an ord~r of nonsuit. 
On June 10, 1968, plaintiff's counsel filed a motion for judgment in the Hustings 
Court, Part II, of the City of Richmond, another court having civil jurisdiction, 
and a complaint in the u.s. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, 
Richmond Division, each action being for the same personal injury and seeking a 
recovery for the same amount of $25,000. Defendant's counsel filed a motion to dis-
miss in each court on the ground that the prior nonsuit order was a final order and 
plaintiff could not reinstitute the action and that, in any event, plaintiff could 
not institute a subsequent action in either the Hustings Court, Part II, of the 
City ~f Richmond or the u. S. District Court. 
(a) Did the Court err in entering the nonsuit order of April 5, 1968? 
(b) Should the action instituted in the Hustings Court, Part II, of the City of 
Richmond be dismissed? 
(c) Should the action instituted in the 'U• s. District Court be dismissed? 
(CIVIL PP~CEDURE-Jurisdietion-Federal J~isdiction)(a) No. The plaintiff may take 
a nonsuit for any reason. By suffering a :nonsuit, plaintiff ends his present suit 
without predudice to his right to bring another; and it is not a final judgment. 
(b) Yes. #8-220 of the Virginia Code p~ovides that after nonsuit no new proceeding 
on the same cause of action shall be had ', in any court other than that in which the 
nonsuit was taken. · 
(c) No. A State statute cannot limit the jurisdiction of the courts of the United 
States. Thus a federal court is not bound by the procedural aspects of Virginia's 
nonsuit statute. Va.8-220; 90 Va.348; 203 F2d 287. 
7. Layne, a citizen of Tennessee, instituted an action at law against Mack, a 
citizen of Virginia, in the u.s. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia seeking a recovery of damages for personal injuries in the sum of $20,000 
allegedly sustained as a result of a breach of implied warranty of fitness of a 
defective lawnmower purchased by Layne from Mack, a retail merchant. Mack filed his 
answer to the complaint, admitting jurisdiction but denying liability, and at the 
same time filed a third party complaint against Noland, a citizen of Virginia, 
alleging that Noland manufactured the lawnmower and that if plaintiff is entitled 
to a recovery for breach of implied warranty, then Noland should be held liable to 
Mack for any recovery by the plaintiff against Mack. 
Noland filed a motion to dismiss the third-party complaint on the grounds (a) 
that any action for personal injury because of an alleged breach of warranty for 
which Noland w~uld be responsible must be brought directly against Noland by Layne, 
and (b) that in any event, the Federal court lacked jurisdiction insofar as the 
third--party C(?mplaint of Mack against Noland was concerned. 
How should the Court rule on each ground of the motion to dismiss? 
(FE~ERAL PROCEDURE) The Court should overrule the motion to dismiss. There is no 
diversity between the third party plaintiff and the third party defendant. But 
since the second action is ancilliary to the first actiQn there is no need for 
ju~isdictional requirement. FRCP 14; Moore 14.25 
8. Defendant Duffy was convicted of grand larceny in the Corporation Court of the 
City of Norfolk on an indictment that read, in part, as follows: 
11 
•••• That defendant Duffy, then residing at 900 Wesley St., 
Portsmouth, Va., did on the evening of March 15,1968, break 
into and unlawfully and feloniously enter Ronald's Clothing 
Store, located at 400 Main St;, Norfolk,Vao, and did then 
and there unlawfully and feloniously steal, take, and carry 
away three suits of clothing of the value of $100 each, all 
against the peace and dignity of the Commonwealth.» 
Duffy had been arrested on the evening of March 16, with the allegedly stolen 
goods in his possession. The evidence, in part, at the trial was that Tom Citizen 
had seen a person, whom he could not identify, loitering around the store building 
at 10:00 po~• on March 15 and Carl Aware had seen a person resembling defendant 
placing ~ndles in an automobile parked in front of the store at 5:00 a.m. on 
March 16. It was also shown that Duffy had been living and still lived at 900 
Willow Road, Virginia Beach, Virginia. 
Duffy moved to set aside the conviction because of alleged defects and fatal 
variances in the indictment on the following grounds, all of which had been 
properly raised during the trial; 
(a) That the indictment did not specifically aver that the offense was committed 
tlwithin the jurisdiction of the court. 11 
(b) That the indictment did not sufficiently identify him as the accused as the 
alleged residence was conclusively shown to be in error. 
(c) That the only evidence of any offense being committed showed that the same 
was committed on March 16, if at all, and therefore, he could not be convicted on 
the indictment alleging an offense on March 15. 
How should the Court rule on each of these contentions? 
• 
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(CRIMINAL PROCEDURE)(a) The motion should be overruled. The recitation of the loca-
tion of the offense in the indictment c~early shows that the offense was committed 
"within the jurisdiction of the court. '' 
(b) This is a completely immaterial omission, where the defendant has been other 
wise properly identified. In the case a~ bar the defendant was arrested with the 
allegedly stolen goods in his possession. 
(c) Under section 19.1-172, an indictment is invalid for failing to state or 
imperfectly stating the time of the offense only when time is the essence of the 
offense. Such was not the case here, and in a felony case the Commonwealth may 
prove the commission of a crime charged ;on a date different from that alleged 
in the indictment. 185 Va. 26; 140 Va. 475; 207 Va. 230. 
9. Homer Friend commenced a suit in equity in the Circuit Court of Albemarle County, 
Virginia, against Thomas Belt and Vance. Pippin. Belt demurred to the original bill 
and he also filed a cross bill against Friend and Pippin seeking affirmative relief. 
Pippin filed a written motion, supported . by affidavit, that Friend's suit be dis-
missed as to him on the ground that he was not a proper party to the original bill. 
A decree was entered sustaining Belt's demurrer to the original bill, and Friend 
did not request leave to amend his original bill. By its decree the court also 
dismissed Friend's suit against Pippin on the ground that he was not a proper party 
to the suit. Shortly after that decree was entered Friend presented a decree to the 
court for dismissal of Belt's cross bill and Pippin presented a decree for dis-
missal of Belt's cross bill against him. 
1. Should the Court enter the decree submitted hy Friend? 
2. Should the Court enter the decree submitted by Pippin? 
(CIVIL PROCEDURE-EQUITY) 1. No. The cross bill sought affirmative relief and is not 
defensive in character, therefore the court should refuse to enter the decree aub-
mitecd by Friend. 
2. Yes. Pippen never was a proper party to the cross bill. Thus, where the 
original bill is dismissed as to ; .a particular party on the ground that he is not 
a ploper party. The dismissal of the cross-bill as to him necessarily follows, 
sir-ce the latter bill can be maintained only against a proper party to the original 
bill. Lile on Equity #153,P~88. 
10. Herb Foster is a resident of Bristol, Va., and his first cousin Jim Foster is a 
resident of Kingsport, Tennessee. During Christmas vacation in 1964, Jim was visit-
inc Herb in Bristol. When Jim was ready to drive back to Kingsport, he asked Herb 
w~~. ether he could have an old rocking chair that had belonged to their joint grand-
fo::..her, and which chair was in the possession of, and owned by Herb. Herb replied 
that he would let Jim have the chair, but that he wished it returned when requested. 
Jim did not understand what Herb had told him, and believed that Herb was making 
hin1 a gift of the chair. Jim put the rocking chair in the rear of his automobile and 
drove off to Kingsport where he kept the chair in his living room. In June of 1965, 
Herb wrote a letter to Jim asking him to return the rocking chair. Jim replied that 
he refused to do so, and claimed that the chair was his. When Jim came to Bristol 
in November of 1968, Herb had him duly served with a notice and a motion for 
judgment in detinue to compel return of the rocking chair. The statute of limita-
tions on an actlon to recover possession of personal property is 5 years in 
Virginia, while the period of limitation in Tennessee is 3 years. Jim pleads the 
Tennessee limitation of 3 years in defense of the action. Is this a good defense. 
(CONFLICTS-STATUTE OF LD1ITATIONS) Yes. With reference to the conflicts aspect 
of the case the same law is applicable to personalty as to realty. The law of the 
state in which real eotate is located determines whether title thereto has been 
acquired by adverse possession. Similarly, the acquisition of title to personalty 
by adverse possession is governed by the law of the state in which the property is 
sltuated. In this case the three year statute of limitation in Tennessee is con-
troling. Rest.Conflicts 259; 13 Va.57,61,63,65; 3 Am.Jr.2d Adv.Poas H5; 6 Lawyers 
Ed.495. 
